HOME OFFICE CIVIL DEFENCE TRAINING MEMORANDUM No. 8

CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS (England and Wales) Deployment for Operations

LONDON
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CONTENTS

	Po	age Pa	aragraphs
Notes on terms used		5	
PART I—INTRODUCTION			
Mobilisation		6	1
Responsibilities of Corps authorities .		6	2
Standing Orders		6	3-4
Tasks of the Civil Defence Corps			
Before attack		6	5-6
After attack		7	7
PART II—PRE-ATTACK LOCATION AND			
EMPLOYMENT OF THE CORPS		7	8
EMPLOTMENT OF THE CORTS			
Headquarters Section		8	9-10
Warden Section			11-12
Welfare Section	· Sub-C		13
Ambulance and First Aid Section			14-16
Rescue Section			17
Civil Defence depots		10	18-20
MEMBERS OF THE MOBILE SECTION OF THE CORPS			
Immediate post-attack action in damaged areas			21
Control of mobile forces			22
In affected areas		11	23
In unaffected areas		11	24
Reconnaissance	Contract land	11	25
Reinforcement	000	11	26 27–28
Local reinforcement		12	21-28
Assembly of mobile forces and movement to		12	29-32
RVs		13	33
Concentration of mobile forces Provision of Forward Medical Aid Units		13	34
		13	35-37
Sub-regional reinforcement		14	38
Deployment to task		14	39
		15	40
General	•	10	10
PART IV—STRATEGIC SITING OF MOBILE RESERVE FORCES			
Provision of strategically sited mobile reserves		15	41
Control of mobile reserves		15	42

NOTES ON TERMS USED

Notes on the meanings of certain terms as they are used in this Memorandum are given below.

Mobilisation: All measures necessary to place the Civil Defence Corps on a war footing; these would include the mustering of members of the Corps for either whole or part-time service, the expansion of the Corps, the provision of premises, vehicles, stores and equipment, the manning of controls, the merging of the Ambulance and First Aid Section with the peace-time ambulance service to form the integrated war-time service and the establishment of the warden organisation on the ground.

Mustering: The initial reporting by members of the Civil Defence Corps in person, on the announcement that the Corps was to be mobilised. Thereafter personnel would be ordered for duty in accordance with the standing orders of the appropriate Section.

Duty station: The control, post, centre, or depot to which Corps personnel would report in accordance with the standing orders of the appropriate Section after mustering and to which they would report, if summoned, after attack.

Civil defence depots: The duty stations of personnel of the Rescue Section and the Ambulance and First Aid Service at which their vehicles and equipment would be housed.

Mobile forces: The Rescue Section, the Ambulance and First Aid Section (included in the war-time Ambulance and First Aid Service) and the mobile elements of the Headquarters Section.

Rendezvous (RV): Places where mobile forces would concentrate or at which they might halt to receive further orders. RVs. should provide hard standing (probably part of a road that could be closed to other traffic) for a considerable number of vehicles. They would normally be adjacent to essential service routes and at a point where communications could be provided. RVs. designed to serve as points at which mobile forces could be concentrated should be selected in peacetime and suitable locations in small towns or villages might serve this purpose. Some of these RVs. might prove suitable for final deployment, others might need to be selected for that purpose after attack.

Assembly: The gathering of members of the mobile civil defence forces at their duty stations when summoned after attack.

Main casualty belt: That part of the area in which as a result of a nuclear burst there are seriously injured casualties, i.e. the area between the inner limit of trapped casualties (the outer limit of all killed) and the outer limit of seriously injured casualties. It would be to the accessible parts of the main casualty belt that priority would be given for operations by units of the mobile forces.

CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS (ENGLAND AND WALES) DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS

PART I

Introduction

Mobilisation

1 The decision to place the Corps on a war footing would be one to be taken by the Government. The announcement that the Corps was to mobilise would be given by Government statement on the radio and television in the first place, and local authorities should have planned to act on these instructions without awaiting the confirmation that would be forthcoming at a later stage.

Responsibilities of Corps authorities

2 The Civil Defence Corps authorities would be responsible for the mobilisation of the local Divisions of the Corps. The arrangements to be made by them would include those for the mustering and allocation to duty stations of members of the Corps, the reception of new recruits, and the provision of the premises, vehicles, equipment and other supplies required to bring the Corps to a state of readiness. Corps authorities have been requested to designate staff who in peace-time would undertake responsibility for planning the mobilisation of the Corps and who would be available to implement these plans at need in emergency.

Standing Orders

- 3 The responsibility for planning for mobilisation and implementing those plans rests with the Corps authorities. If, however, the Corps is to be able to mobilise in the shortest possible time, it is essential that each member of the Corps should know in advance what action he should take on mobilisation being announced and the part he would be expected to play thereafter. Standing orders will be drawn up by Corps authorities for each Section and Sub-section of the Corps and each duty station. These standing orders will give in detail the arrangements for mustering and allocation to duty, and will cover such matters as whole and part-time service, manning and shift working, and the arrangements for the provision of vehicles, equipment and other supplies.
- 4 During their training all members of the Corps will be briefed on the instructions contained in standing orders relevant to themselves. In addition, a mobilisation card will be issued to each Corps member showing, among other things, the premises at which he should muster on mobilisation being announced and, if possible, the duty station to which he should proceed.

Tasks of the Civil Defence Corps

Before attack

5 Once the Government had ordered the institution of emergency measures, including the mobilisation of the Corps, local authorities would be faced

with the urgent task of advising and helping the public on what should be done in expectation of an attack, and of organising the pre-attack dispersal scheme if the Government decided that it should be implemented. At the same time the evacuation of hospitals from the main centres of population might be undertaken involving assistance from the Ambulance Service. Local authorities would look to the Corps to assist them in these tasks, which would be regarded as the primary tasks of the Corps at this stage.

- 6 The importance attached to the work of advising and helping the public is such that members of all Sections of the Corps, except those engaged on essential section duties, would be detailed to assist the Warden Section. The extent to which members of the Corps would have to be retained on section duties would vary from Section to Section. Apart from the duty of ambulance crews to help with the evacuation of hospitals and of welfare teams to assist with dispersal, section duties to put the Corps in a state of readiness to fulfil its post-attack role would include:
 - (a) Assistance in the manning of static controls;
 - (b) bringing to a state of readiness the warden organisation and any street or village party organisation which might have been developed;
 - (c) improving the protection of duty stations;
 - (d) receiving vehicles and equipment;
 - (e) guarding and maintaining vehicles and equipment held at duty stations:
 - (f) organising first aid arrangements in the area of each street and village party;
 - (g) setting up and manning Welfare Section and rest centres.

After attack

7 After attack the task of members of the Corps living or stationed in an area of damage would be to give immediate assistance during the vital period between attack and the arrival of fall-out. Elsewhere, in areas unaffected by the attack, at the earliest possible time after attack the task of the Corps would be to provide mobile reinforcements for the damaged areas. The Corps would also assist in the care of the homeless, billeting and emergency feeding and in implementing the scheme for public control, including the clearance of Z zones.

PART II

Pre-Attack Location and Employment of the Corps

8 After mustering, the Corps would be deployed as set out in the succeeding paragraphs. As already stated, each member of the Corps will be provided in peace-time with as much information as possible of the local plan for his Section and the part he would be expected to play in an emergency. If mobilisation were to become necessary before this information could be given, each volunteer would be told, at the time of mustering, the duty station to which he should report, the duty to be undertaken and, if possible, the address of the warden post nearest his home.

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(b) bringing to a state of readiness the warden organisation and any street or village party organisation which might have been developed;

(c) improving the protection of duty stations;

(d) receiving vehicles and equipment;

- (e) guarding and maintaining vehicles and equipment held at duty stations;
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Headquarters Section

- 9 Members of both the static and mobile elements of the Headquarters Section would report to the control designated as their duty station. The first task would be to provide for the staffing of the static control and for reliefs during the pre-attack period. It would be essential to provide a full working complement at the control at all times. Personnel of the mobile elements of the Section should be included in the duty roster, if necessary, to achieve this. The vehicles and equipment of the mobile elements of the Section (mobile control, signals, reconnaissance and field cable vehicles and transportable boxed wireless sets) should be held as near as possible to the control and members of the Section would be expected to assist in the equipping of additional vehicles. It would be of advantage if some of the drivers could be retained at the control (see paragraphs 29 and 30) but in general, personnel not required for immediate duty at the control should be instructed to return to their homes. Those not on the duty roster of their control should make themselves available to the post warden of the nearest established warden post to their homes to help and advise the public.
- 10 If the post-attack situation was such that mobile controls, reconnaissance or field cable units could be used in the area or were required for reinforcement elsewhere, the location of the Section vehicles near to the control would make it possible for the personnel to man them to be collected with the minimum delay.

Warden Section

- 11 During training every member of the Warden Section should become familiar with the area in which he would work in war, even though it may not be possible to disclose the address of the post. After mustering, members of the Warden Section should take post at the district control, sector, warden or patrol post designated as their duty station. The first priority would be to man the levels down to and including warden posts and then to establish patrol posts and to assist in bringing into a state of readiness any street or village party organisation which may have been developed. The senior warden officer at each level would be responsible for seeing to the completion of the arrangements for the immediately subordinate level. A post warden would be authorised to use the services of any member of the Corps who reported to him. He should try to make use of special skills (for instance, members of first aid parties should be used firstly for the arrangements for the care of casualties), but he would be free to detail trained members of other Sections to act as senior wardens if trained wardens were not available. Post wardens having a sector post in their territory should also bear in mind the assistance that the sector warden might need and should consult him on the staff required. New recruits should be used to bring sector, warden and patrol posts to their full complements; such recruits would receive their training by working alongside trained personnel. The senior warden officer at each control or post should report completion of or deficiencies in the organisation to his immediate superior.
- 12 The most important tasks falling to the warden organisation during the preattack period would be to help and advise the public, especially on the application of the advice given in Civil Defence Handbook No. 10; to co-ordinate

arrangements for making the utmost use of the resources available within the area, especially for fire-fighting and aid to casualities and the homeless; and to complete the scheme for passing messages to members of the Corps at their homes.

Welfare Section

13 Members of the Welfare Section should report to the Welfare Section centre or other premises designated as their duty station. Duty rosters providing for reliefs should be prepared, but personnel not immediately required to help with the dispersal scheme, the manning of Welfare Section centres and the skeleton manning and equipping of prepared rest centres should be instructed to return to their homes and make their services available to the nearest post warden to help and advise the public.

Ambulance and First Aid Section

- 14 On mobilisation the Ambulance and First Aid Section would be merged with the Ambulance Service to form the war-time Ambulance and First Aid Service. The standing orders of the Section should detail the exact arrangements. Ambulance crews should report to the depot designated as their duty station to assist in the mounting of stretcher fittings in requisitioned vehicles and to form ambulance detachments-even if a particular detachment had to be under strength, i.e. fewer than six vehicles. As detachments were formed they might be called on to assist or relieve detachments engaged in hospital evacuation. This would be a continuing process since additional drivers would become available from new recruits. At some depots a roster to provide an ambulance service for pre-attack home cover would be necessary. Ambulances not required in the evacuation of hospitals would remain at their depots, but their crews, apart from any required to be on duty, should be instructed to return to their homes and make their services available to the nearest post warden. Ambulances engaged in hospital evacuation would, on completion of the tasks, or if withdrawn from the task for any reason, be directed to appropriate depots.
- 15 First aid personnel should report to the depot designated as their duty station and assist in the equipping of requisitioned vehicles. On completion of this task personnel, apart from any required for holding party duties (see paragraph 18) should be instructed to return to their homes and make their services available to the nearest post warden.
- 16 Ambulance crews and first aid personnel who returned to their homes should take with them their individual first aid kits. In conjunction with the warden service in their home areas their priority task would be to assist in setting up the first aid organisation required in the area of each street party. On completion of this task they should assist the warden organisation in advising the public.

Rescue Section

17 Members of the Rescue Section should report to the depot designated as their duty station and assist in the equipping of requisitioned vehicles. Apart from any required for holding party duties (see paragraph 18) they should be instructed to return to their homes, taking with them their individual manpacks, and should make their services available to the nearest post warden.

Civil defence depots

- 18 At civil defence depots pre-attack 'on-duty' personnel should consist of an officer-in-charge and a small holding party, preferably of drivers, to be responsible for the safe custody of the vehicles and equipment, for maintaining the vehicles in a state of readiness, and for the collection of 'off-duty' personnel if assembly were ordered following attack (see paragraph 29). If possible the officer-in-charge and the holding party should have been selected in peace-time and the arrangements detailed in the standing orders of the Rescue and Ambulance and First Aid Sections. Members of these Sections should be informed during peace-time training of the general location of their depot, i.e. the town or village, if it was not possible to disclose the address.
- 19 The choice and location of depots should be related to the territorial organisation of Rescue and Ambulance and First Aid columns. The size of the force attached to each depot and whether a depot should house units of both sections would depend on local circumstances. In the larger county boroughs a number of depots sited round the periphery, each serving personnel in a part of the town, might be required. In the smaller county boroughs, a single depot near the town centre might be the most convenient arrangement. In the counties one or more depots might be provided in the area of each county district located at a place convenient of access to the majority of personnel attached to it. The forces at a county depot would be likely to be measured in parties or platoons rather than in companies, but in county borough depots, particularly those where a single central depot had been established and the full establishment recruited, companies or even columns might have to be accommodated.
- 20 As will be appreciated from Part III of this Memorandum, considerable advantage would be gained in counties if depots could be located near controls; problems of communication would be reduced with a consequential saving in the time taken to institute reinforcement moves after attack.

PART III

Post-attack Action by Members of the Mobile Sections of the Corps

Immediate post-attack action in damaged areas

21 In a damaged area all static forces, together with all 'off-duty' members of the Corps, should render immediate assistance in their home area. The priority tasks would be to put out fires, to care for casualties and to ensure as far as possible that survivors were in the best available cover. Rescue and first aid personnel should preferably be employed on those tasks for which their training had specially fitted them, first in their home area and later under the direction of the wardens in the patrol or post area. On receipt of the BLACK warning wardens would have discretion to keep those engaged on essential tasks at work until the dose-rate reached 10 rph or until the most urgent tasks had been completed, if earlier. All should then return to refuge. When the dose-rate fell to 10 rph wardens would have discretion to call for a resumption of essential work. On the arrival of reinforcements members of the mobile sections should report to the officer-in-charge of the reinforcing unit for attachment to one of the reinforcing parties.

Control of mobile forces

22 The control of all civil defence mobile forces would initially be vested in the Sub-regional Commissioner who would be responsible for the organisation and deployment of sub-regional reinforcements (see paragraphs 35-37).

Control of mobile forces in affected areas

23 A Corps authority, any part of whose territory lay within the main casualty belt, would be accorded discretion to deploy its own mobile forces for reinforcement within its own area. As a safeguard Sub-regional headquarters would retain the right to issue a 'Stop' order to any Corps authority affected by the attack if the situation warranted. For example, this might be necessary if early movement of forces might prejudice the ability of Sub-regional headquarters to organise later reinforcement or where a risk of fall-out from a distant bomb would threaten movements of forces initiated by a Corps authority in ignorance of the threat. In the case of ambulance crews, however, while assembly orders could be issued it would not be possible to give orders for final deployment until Forward Medical Aid Units (FMAUs) had been allocated and/or hospitals to be used, designated (see paragraph 34).

Control of mobile forces in unaffected areas

24 The forces of those Corps authorities, no part of whose territory lay within the main casualty belt, would not be deployed except under orders of Subregional headquarters. Although certain preparatory steps (see paragraphs 35-36) might be taken by Sub-regional headquarters soon after bomb fall, movement over any distance of major reinforcements drawn from unaffected Corps authorities would have to be delayed until the overall situation was sufficiently well known.

Reconnaissance

25 The actual form of strategic reconnaissance is currently under review. Until new or amended plans are made known the system set out in Civil Defence Training Memorandum No. 5, modified to accord with the new control organisation and the location of reconnaissance vehicles at controls, should be followed.

Reinforcement

26 The public warning in force in particular areas would not be the governing factor in arriving at decisions to order the assembly and deployment of reinforcements. These decisions would be based on intelligence appreciations of all relevant factors. Reference has been made in paragraphs 23 and 24 to reinforcement by a Corps authority within its own borders and between Corps authorities under the direction of Sub-regional headquarters. For the purpose of this Memorandum these two forms of reinforcement are hereafter referred to as local reinforcement and sub-regional reinforcement respectively.

Local reinforcement

- 27 On the receipt of information as to the ground zero (GZ) power and type of burst of a nuclear weapon affecting its territory a county or county borough control should carry out a check of communications to its subordinates. In the light of the fall-out prediction it should then take all possible steps to restore the control and communications chain if disrupted, calling on Subregional headquarters if necessary, for assistance. An estimate of the number and location of casualties should be prepared by the method given in Civil Defence Training Memorandum No. 3 and if seriously injured casualties could be expected outside the fall-out limit line, the control should consider whether to draw reinforcements from the undamaged parts of its territory.
- 28 If a decision to reinforce were taken, the control concerned would issue orders for the required personnel of the mobile sections (a) to assemble at their duty stations, and (b) to concentrate for deployment into the damaged area.

Assembly of mobile forces and movements to RVs.

- 29 Depending on local circumstances assembly of mobile forces could be organised either by:
 - (a) personnel being ordered to report to specified posts of the warden organisation from which they would be collected by a vehicle sent forward from their control or depot:
 - (b) personnel being ordered to make their own way independently to their duty stations.
- 30 The first system might be essential in counties where distances between homes and duty stations were considerable and the second might be capable of implementation only in county boroughs. In many places, however, a combination of the two systems might be best, personnel living within easy reach of their duty station making their own arrangements and those at a great distance being transported for at least a part of the way. There are clearly a number of possible refinements—for example, it might be convenient to collect some personnel direct from their homes. A reconnaissance party collected in this way could then be briefed as to its mission by wireless without returning to the static control. Arrangements might also be made for personnel with their own transport to collect other personnel in their neighbourhood to take them to the duty station. Whatever system is adopted it would be essential for the details to be planned in advance and incorporated in standing orders so that messages ordering assembly could be kept as short and simple as possible. The ideal would be for messages to consist of

- a single word "Assemble", each person receiving it knowing the action he should then take.
- 31 When summoned to assemble, personnel should take with them their personal equipment, a mug, plate, knife, fork and spoon, food sufficient for 48 hours and two pints of water. The stocks of food and water held at depots should be taken with forces deployed from their depots as reinforcements. If operations continued for an appreciable period of time and forces could not be returned to their home areas for rest and replenishment it would be necessary to make arrangements to maintain them in the field. This would probably involve the designation of suitably located towns or large villages, to act in a support capacity to which forces could be withdrawn.
- 32 At the same time that orders for personnel to assemble were despatched, the county or county borough control should order the officer-in-charge at the depot (or in the case of mobile elements of the Headquarters Section, the control) involved to put into effect the local plan for assembly. At the same time or as soon after as possible the control should also designate the rendezvous at which forces from the particular area were to concentrate after assembling and, in the light of police and scientific advice, the onward route to be taken.

Concentration of mobile forces

33 On arrival at their duty stations personnel would be formed into parties and detachments as appropriate and contingents should then move to a designated rendezvous for concentration into larger units. Further movement orders, if their route and eventual destination had not already been determined, would be sent by the responsible control to the rendezvous. If forces in sufficient strength were available from a single depot, e.g. that of a large municipal borough, they might be deployed from the depot direct to the scene of operations. The deployment of forces to task and their sub-allotment to the lower levels of control are dealt with at paragraphs 38 and 39.

Provision of FMAUs

34 It would be essential for a control organising local reinforcement to request Sub-regional headquarters for the support of FMAUs at the earliest possible time. Until these had been allocated and/or hospitals to be used had been designated, orders as to the final deployment of ambulances could not be issued.

Sub-regional reinforcement

35 If an attack had seriously affected part of the Sub-region, Sub-regional headquarters would, as soon as a fall-out prediction had been prepared, issue orders to county and county borough controls whose territory had been unaffected and which lay on the upwind side of the predicted path of fall-out, to provide any mobile control and/or signals units to restore the control and communications chain. If it became clear that a county or county borough control had been put out of action or could no longer effectively control the whole of its territory, Sub-regional headquarters would decide

whether it should be replaced by a mobile control or whether responsibility for the whole or part of its territory should be transferred to a neighbouring control. Sub-regional headquarters would issue warning orders as to the likely need for reinforcements at a later stage or, even at the early stage, it might order the assembly of some forces.

- 36 After the position of the fall-out limit was established, Sub-regional head-quarters would consider whether an allocation of forces to undertake tasks in any part of the main casualty belt unaffected by fall-out should be made. If reinforcement measures were to be instituted it would call upon unaffected county and county borough controls to put them in train. Sub-regional head-quarters might also at that stage decide to order the assembly of the whole or part of the mobile forces in the unaffected areas in anticipation of later requirements.
- 37 When the position of the first 10r line was established, Sub-regional head-quarters would consider the practicability of issuing orders regarding major reinforcement. The summoning of personnel to, and their assembly at, duty stations, the movement of contingents to selected rendezvous, and their concentration into larger units should take place on the general lines indicated in paragraphs 29 to 33. Where considerable distances were involved movement would have to be carried out along prescribed routes, e.g. essential service routes, through a series of rendezvous at some or all of which forces might be further concentrated, possibly to column strength.

Deployment to task

38 On arrival at specified forward rendezvous, the command of reinforcements would pass from Sub-regional headquarters and the reinforcing authorities to the control being reinforced. It would be the responsibility of the latter to brief commanders of incoming forces, to determine priorities, and to allocate the forces to subordinate levels of control. Possible sites for FMAUs will have been selected in peace-time by Regional Hospital Boards in conjunction with local authorities; the control being reinforced would select the most suitable surviving site.

Sub-allotment of mobile forces

39 Forces would continue to be sub-allocated by each level of control until-finally deployed to tasks in warden post areas. Too great a fragmentation of units would prejudice effective control and administration. No single rescue or first aid platoon should, therefore, be dispersed over more than the territory of a warden post except in special circumstances, e.g., where the work was concentrated on the border between two post areas, in which case a platoon might be divided for work between them. Within an area it might not therefore be possible to undertake tasks in all sectors simultaneously, and similarly, within a sector it might not be possible to provide aid to some post areas until work in others had been completed. Once deployed to tasks personnel should not be withdrawn until their tasks were completed or the war emergency dose (WED) had been received or they were relieved by other forces. Short rest periods would have to be arranged within units and taken at or near the scene of operations.

General

- 40 Given proper planning and allowing for the inevitable delay in movement that the likely effects of attack would impose, it seems reasonable to believe that, in the majority of cases, forces could be deployed to task under the above arrangements as quickly as it became prudent to commit them. The advantages of the system are:
 - (a) Pre-attack assistance rendered to the public would reduce the postattack problem;
 - (b) immediate post-attack assistance in the vital period before the arrival of fall-out could be given by trained members of the Corps throughout the area in which casualties had been sustained, including those parts of the area which might be denied relief from outside for a considerable period;
 - (c) mobile reinforcements could be organised by Corps authorities from within their own area and be followed by reinforcements from other Corps authorities provided under the direction of Sub-regional headquarters:
 - (d) outside the main casualty belt, where units of the mobile forces could not be made available, a leavening of personnel trained in first aid would be present to organise relief measures.

PART IV

Strategic Siting of Mobile Reserve Forces

Provision of strategically sited mobile reserves

41 Much of the foregoing has been directed to the arrangements to be made while the strength of the Civil Defence Corps remains insufficient to be able to provide substantial bodies of mobile forces strategically located before attack and to meet the home cover requirements (i.e. for the provision of advice and assistance to the public before attack, the establishment of the control, warden and first aid organisations and immediate help to the public after attack). If, however, the recruited strength of the Corps reached a level where mobile forces could be relieved of home cover responsibilities it would be desirable to station them outside the major conurbations to form a strategic reserve. Accordingly, where in any county borough, or in any part of a county which is a dispersal area within a major conurbation, trained members of the Corps are, or become available in numbers sufficient to meet the home cover requirements, mobile forces surplus to those requirements may be located in depots outside the conurbation.

Control of mobile reserves

42 In operations reserve forces would be under the control of Sub-regional headquarters. After an attack their release to the authorities in whose areas they were recruited or their other employment would be the subject of decision by Sub-regional headquarters.

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