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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Executive Registry

SM-417-82 7 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army

Chief of Naval Operations Chief of Staff, US Air Force

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Chief of the Defence Staff, National

Defence Headquarters, Canada

Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace

Defense Command

Director, International Communication Agency Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

Commandant, US Coast Guard

-Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

US Commander in Chief, Europe

Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command

Commander in Chief, US Southern Command

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

Director of Strategic Target Planning

Director, Joint Deployment Agency

Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

Manager, National Communications System:

Director, Defense Communications Agency

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director, Defense Logistics Agency

Director, Defense Mapping Agency

Director, Defense Nuclear Agency

Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency

Director, National Security Agency/Chief,

Central Security Service

Commander, Joint Coordination Center

Director, Joint Staff

JCS Review completed

Subject: Exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 83 (U)

1. (U) The Annex provides concept and objectives planning for Exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 83 for your planning or information, as appropriate.

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2. (S) The scenario for WINTEX-CIMEX 83, as discussed in the Annex, will provide participants with training in crisis management procedures while addressing global commitments. The scenario is not designed to exercise strategic nuclear plans and procedures (SIOP, SACEUR Scheduled Strike Program, or SACLANT Subsequent Operations).

For the US Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Fom-Cle

F. J. McCONVILLE Colonel, USA Secretary

Attachment

Copy to:

ANNEX	<u>1</u>
CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES FOR EXERCISE "WINTEX-CIMEX 83" (U)	2
1. (C) Exercise Concept. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will	<u>3</u>
sponsor a worldwide procedural general war command post	4
exercise (CPX) in CY 1983, "WINTEX-CIMEX 83," which will	5
interface with the NATO general war CPX of the same name.	<u>6</u>
a. (S) The political and intelligence background is	7
intended to describe a situation leading to a confrontation	<u>8</u>
between Orange and Blue nations. The lead-in scenarios	9
emphasize Orange perceptions of Blue weaknesses. Such	10
perceptions generate a chain of events by which limited	11
Orange political objectives supported by selectively	12
increased military buildup develop into a major conflict	<u>13</u>
with the Blue nations. Orange perceptions of Blue will be	14
combined with a belief that the presently favorable	<u>15</u>
correlation of forces in favor of Orange might disappear or	<u>16</u>
be neutralized in the near future.	<u>17</u>
b. (U) The political and intelligence lead-in scenarios	18
will:	<u>19</u>
(1) (C) Support early preparation for and deployment of	20
external reinforcements.	21
(2) (S) Vary intensity of play. Early stages will	22
stress political and maritime participants, whereas	23
middle and later stages will most affect civil and	24
military participants. Coordination among the nations	<u>25</u>
of the Alliance will be actively worked throughout the	26
exercise.	<u>27</u>
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(3) (S) Exercise Crisis Management procedures from	<u>1</u>
Simple Alert (SA) and Reinforced Alert (RA) to	2
consideration of the declaration of General Alert (GA)	3
(Phase 1). Exercise play from GA to end of the exercise	4
(ENDEX) (Phase 2) will be a period of successful	<u>5</u>
conventional defense, followed by increased Orange	<u>6</u>
efforts that justify request to NATO political	7
authorities for the initial use of nuclear weapons.	8
2. (S) Exercise Design and Objectives. Exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 83	<u>9</u>
will consist of a pre-play period (17-23 February 1983)	10
followed by a two-phased active exercise period. Phase 1	11
(24 February - 3 March 1983) is the crisis phase and phase 2	12
(4-9 March 1983) is the war phase.	13
a. (S) Pre-play. The aim of this period of play will be to	14
exercise the early stages of crisis management, including	<u>15</u>
indications and warning. US headquarters will play between	16
1200Z and 2000Z daily, including Saturday and Sunday, to	<u>17</u>
insure trans-Atlantic consultation. Decisions made during	18
the pre-play period will be pre-planned and accepted by all	: <u>19</u>
players. The objectives of the pre-play period are to:	20
(1) (S) Test existing civil and military arrangements	21
for crisis management and procedures for civilian/	22
military cooperation at both national and NATO levels.	<u>23</u>
(2) (S) Exercise and test reinforcement and logistic	24
plans during a period of tension.	<u>25</u>
(3) (S) Exercise the implementation of those alert	<u>26</u>
measures prescripted before start of the exercise	<u>27</u>
(STARTEX) and the requests for a limited number of	28
selected measures during play.	29
(4) (S) Exercise and test procedures for obtaining,	30
deploying, and supporting maritime contingency forces.	31

SECRET 2 Annex

(5) (S) Test procedures for preparing and operating the	. 1
sea and air lines of communication.	2
b. (C) Exercise Play. The aim of WINTEX-CIMEX 83 is to	3
exercise civil and military authorities both national and	4
within NATO in order to maintain and improve NATO's ability	5
to function effectively in a period of crisis and war. The	6
broad objectives of the exercise are to:	. 7
(1) (C) Test the effectiveness of existing civil and	8
military arrangements for crisis and war and procedures	9
for civil/military cooperation of NATO and national	10
authorities.	11
(2) (C) Exercise and test reinforcement, logistic, and	12
resupply arrangements during a period of tension and	<u>13</u>
hostilities.	14
(3) (C) Exercise the implementation of alert systems and	15
practice national, civil, and military readiness	16
procedures.	. 17
(4) (C) Exercise political, military, and civil	18
consultations required for crisis management during a	: 19
period of rising tension and conflict involving nuclear	20
release procedures and to exercise the nuclear	21
consultation process, including consideration of	22
appropriate follow-on nuclear weapon contingency	23
planning.	24
(5) (C) Test the procedures used to deploy forces in	25
support of selected OPLANs.	26
(6) (C) Test the ability of NATO to exercise command and	27
control under a situation of degraded communications	28
systems.	29
(7) (C) Exercise defense of NATO sea and air lines of	<u>30</u>

SECRET 3 Annex

<u>31</u>

communication.

-•	(b) Exercise wintex-cimex 83. The design of exercise	
ΝI	NTEX-CIMEX 83 will:	
	(1) (C) Contribute to active participation and interplay	
	with the NATO participants. In this connection, all	
	scenario items must be compatible with and acceptable to	
	the NATO exercise. Events will be developed to portray	
	a scenario that is adequate to properly exercise	
	national resources.	,
	(2) (C) Portray a situation in which Congress declares a	
	national emergency and the President directs full	1
	mobilization.	1
	(3) (C) Exercise applicable portions of the mobilization	1
	and deployment plans and procedures of participating	1
	unified and specified commands, Joint Deployment Agency	1
	(JDA), Services, DOD agencies and elements, and OJCS in	1
	support of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and worldwide war	1
	at sea.	1
	(4) (C) Support mobilization and deployment efforts by	1
	Federal civil departments and agencies.	1
	(5) (C) Provide a worldwide maritime environment that	2
	supports warfighting at sea and extensive maritime	2
	involvement in all global theaters. Pre-exercise US	2
	carrier battle group (CVBG) dispositions will be six	2
	operational CVBGs in the Atlantic and five operational	2
	CVBGs in the Pacific. Two CVBGs from the Atlantic will	2
	be located in the Mediterranean and two CVBGs from the	2
	Pacific will be in the Indian Ocean. The Joint Chiefs	2
	of Staff should make an early recommendation concerning	2
	the distribution of forces.	2
	(6) (C) Pacific forces committed to NATO (both SACEUR	3
	and SACLANT) in the DPQ-81 Assigned category will move	3
	in accordance with the OPLAN Time-Phased Force	3

4 Annex

SECRET

	Deployment Data (TPFDD). Use of forces in the categories	1
	of Earmarked and Other Forces for NATO should be	2
	addressed.	3
3.	(U) Specific National Objectives. The specific objectives	4
for	r exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 83 are to:	5
	a. (C) Execute and evaluate the Emergency Action Procedures	6
	of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to NCA decisions.	2
	Evaluate procedures for transfer of authority (CHOP) with	8
	NATO.	9
	b. (C) Implement and evaluate the Crisis Staffing	10
	Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.	11
	c. (C) Exercise and evaluate crisis management procedures	12
	during increasing alert conditions, conventional war, and	13
	selective nuclear weapon release procedures.	14
	d. (C) Exercise the Joint Deployment System and the	15
	capability of the JDA to coordinate and monitor deployment	16
	operations.	17
	e. (C) Exercise DOD and Federal civil departments' and	18
	agencies' plans for reinforcement of NATO.	19
	f. (C) Exercise and evaluate conventional and unconven-	20
	tional defense plans for Europe (NATO), the Atlantic, the	2
	Pacific, and Alaska.	22
	g. (C) Exercise and evaluate the procedures for con-	2
	sultations with the North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning	24
	Committee, the selective release of tactical nuclear	2!
	weapons in Europe, and defense against chemical weapons	26
	within NATO.	2
	h. (S) Exercise the operational utility and timeliness of	2
	selected reporting systems.	2
	i. (C) Exercise procedures for the collection, collation,	3
	dissemination, and utilization of all-source tactical and	3

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national-level intelligence in a joint/combined	1
environment. Evaluate procedures for release of US	<u>2</u>
intelligence to NATO.	<u>3</u>
j. (C) Exercise and evaluate the plans and procedures of	4
theater and CONUS agencies concerned with noncombatant	<u>5</u>
evacuation and CONUS reception operations.	<u>6</u>
k. (C) Exercise the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network as it	. 7
supports the NCA, National Military Command System, unified	. 8
and specified commands, and the Services.	. <u>9</u>
1. (C) Evaluate the adequacy of command center procedures	10
and communications systems support.	11
m. (C) Exercise and evaluate the impact of selected C3	12
countermeasures on other exercise objectives, including the	13
interruption of satellite and other modes of communi-	14
cations, and degradation of NATO and US communications	15
systems. Exercise ability to restore and reroute the	16
Defense Communications System.	17
	18
n. (S) Evaluate communications with Major NATO Commanders	. 19
in support of selective release procedures.	20
o. (C) Exercise specific logistic policies and procedures.	21
Logistic objectives will include:	22
(1) (C) Procedures for filling shortfalls in pre-	23
positioned war reserve materiel stocks.	24
(2) (C) Authority for NATO commanders to redistribute	25
selected assets.	26
(3) (C) Adequacy of host-nation support.	<del></del>
(4) (C) Movement and transportation reporting	27
procedures.	28
(5) (C) Effect of infrastructure limitations for	29
airfields, fuel and ammunition storage, port facilities,	. 30
and emergency repair facilities.	3

Annex

(6) (C) Procedures to supply POL to multinational	1
maritime force from commercial sources.	2
(7) (C) Capability to support reinforcement and deployed	. 3
air/ground forces POL requirements.	4
(8) (C) Procedures to divert POL ocean tankers.	<u>5</u>
(9) (C) Procedures to place logistic support ships on a	<u>6</u>
wartime basis.	<u>7</u>
(10) (C) Civil and military medical facility capability	8
and agency cooperation during crisis.	<u>9</u>
(11) (C) Procedures for engineering support.	10
(12) (C) Procedures for personnel replacement and	11
fillers.	12
p. (C) Evaluate applicable portions of mobilization plans	13
and procedures.	14
q. (S) Exercise the implementation process and procedures	· <u>15</u>
of the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (MCC	<u>16</u>
100/28).	17
r. (S) Evaluate strategic lift capability to meet	18
requirements for deployment, aeromedical evacuation,	: 19
noncombatant evacuation operations, and replacement/filler	20
personnel, and movement of enemy prisoner of war personnel.	<u>21</u>
s. (C) Evaluate security assistance programs for non-NATO	22
allies during a major European war.	<u>23</u>
t. (C) Investigate the adequacy and utility of the joint	24
reporting structure and its interface with NATO reporting	<u>25</u>
systems.	26
u. (S) Exercise selected plans to deter, isolate, and	27
contain Cuba and protect Caribbean sea lines of	28
communication (SLOCs).	<u>29</u>
v. (S) Exercise early reinforcement of Iceland and evaluate	30
impact on subsequent OPLANs.	31

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	w. (S) Evaluate procedures and capabilities for all	<u>1</u>
	Military Sealift Command shipping in support of CINC	2
	OPLANS.	3
	x. (S) Exercise and evaluate procedures for NORAD space and	4
	missile warning missions as they apply in the United States	<u>5</u>
	and NATO.	<u>6</u>
	y. (C) Exercise casualty reporting and replacement	7
	procedures.	8
4.	(U) Phasing	<u>9</u>
	a. (C) Planning Phase. This consists of developing the	10
	exercise and establishing pre-exercise assumptions.	11
	Assumptions will set the stage for the execution phase by	12
	portraying a series of assumed events that identify initial	13
	readiness preparations taken by the United States.	14
	Included are actions short of open hostilities pertaining,	15
	but not limited, to:	16
	(1) (U) Mobilization.	17
	(2) (C) Deployments in support of augmentation of	18
	unified and specified commands.	: 19
	(3) (U) Travel restrictions.	<u>20</u>
	(4) (U) Noncombatant evacuation.	21
	(5) (C) Readiness postures of supporting agencies and	22
	commands, as well as force status.	23
	b. (C) Pre-Exercise Phase. The pre-play phase of WINTEX-	24
	CIMEX 83 will be conducted during a 7-day period on an	<u>25</u>
	8-hour-per-day basis beginning at 171200Z February 1983 and	<u> 26</u>
	ending 231800Z February 1983. Services, commands, and	27
	agencies should participate to the extent required to	28
	accomplish objectives of this phase, which will deal	<u>29</u>
		<u>30</u>
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primarily with deployment and consultation. It will also	· <u>1</u>
include intensive player training and briefing to prepare	2
for the execution phase.	<u>3</u>
c. (S) Execution Phase. The execution phase will be played	4
on a 24-hour-per-day basis and divided into two phases	<u>5</u>
Crisis (Phase 1) and War (Phase 2). STARTEX is 240800Z	<u>6</u>
February 1983. Phase 1 is the period from STARTEX until	7
declaration of GA and Phase 2 is the period from GA until	. 8
ENDEX, 091600Z March 1983. Phase 1 will be concerned with	9
reinforcement play, crisis management, and alert	10
declarations. Phase 2 will be concerned with hostilities	11
and nuclear consultations.	12
(1) (S) Exercise play during Phase 1 will test national	<u>13</u>
as well as NATO crisis management procedures and	14
preparation for war. Allied nations as well as NATO	15
will be placed on a war footing, and steps will be taken	16
to prepare for war.	17
(2) (S) Play during Phase 2 will be concerned with	18
national support of NATO and nuclear consultations.	19
Decisionmakers must also contend with domestic problems	20
and international contingencies in Southwest Asia and	2]
Central America and with warfighting on Atlantic and	22
Pacific SLOCs.	23
(3) (S) Before STARTEX, the broad scenario will depict a	24
period of rising tension that is worldwide in scope. In	25
the European area, there will be a protracted warning	20
period portraying strategy to reestablish by use of	<u>2</u>
military pressure the Orange predominance within the	2
Soviet Bloc and the Orange readiness to use military	2
means to reinforce political pressure on the West. To	3

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enhance NATO's defensive capability and display a common

<u>31</u>

deterrence to that threat, the Blue DPC decides to	<u>1</u>
reinforce Europe on 1 February 1983. Simultaneous with	<u>2</u>
this period of rising tension will be a rapid	3
deterioration of political, economic, and military	4
conditions worldwide. Tensions in Southwest Asia will	<u>5</u>
continue to threaten US and Blue oil supplies.	<u>6</u>
Political and economic unrest will exist in Southeast	<u>7</u>
Asia. US merchant shipping will be harassed by Orange	<u>8</u>
ships in PACOM posing a significant threat to Blue water	9
and intercoastal trade between west coast ports	10
and Alaska. The threat of hostilities continues	11
in the Northern Pacific, Southwest Asia, and Central	<u>12</u>
America. Domestic unrest and resistance to the	<u>13</u>
reinforcement of Europe result in demonstrations and	14
antinuclear discord.	<u>15</u>
d. (C) Post-Exercise Phase. The post-exercise phase will	<u>16</u>
include a critique and analysis and the identification of	<u>17</u>
shortfalls based on stated exercise analysis objectives,	18
all of which will be utilized as a framework for remedial	: 19
action.	20
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